Why ASEAN should not be a US-China battleground

In recent years, the United States has sought to deepen its relationship with Southeast Asia, evidenced by steps such as the signing of the U.S.–ASEAN Comprehensive Partnership. Yet this stands against a backdrop of increasing ambivalence in Southeast Asian capitals about the United States. The 2024 survey by Singapore-based think tank ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute has shown that, for the first time, the region’s elites would likely side with China by a slim margin during a conflict with the United States, if given no other choice. Should Washington be concerned?

Working in the United States’ favor for closer ties with Southeast Asia is that the region’s states are looking for partners, particularly in security and economics. The Philippines has deepened defense ties with the United States, its ally, with the expansion of U.S. bases. Indonesia continues to proudly co-host Exercise Garuda Shield, a massive annual multinational exercise, while the Indonesian military strongly prefers working with its American counterpart and purchasing U.S. hardware. Singapore recently deepened its collaboration with Washington in AI and autonomous systems in the defense domain. Considered by some a “client state” of China, Cambodia looks poised to strengthen defense relations with the United States, especially further opportunities in accessing U.S. professional military education programs, which are well respected in the region.

Washington is also pushing on an open door when it comes to supporting economic goals among Southeast Asian partners. The same survey that gave rise to alarm about alignment shows clearly that Southeast Asian elites see “unemployment and economic recession” as well as “widening socio-economic gaps and rising income inequality” among their country’s top challenges for 2024. The region needs partners. In Vietnam, despite rejecting Hanoi’s bid for market economy status, greater trade and investment from the United States has been welcomed as part of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed last year, particularly in financing private sector projects in infrastructure, healthcare, and small business sectors. Southeast Asia’s second-largest economy, Thailand is similarly enthusiastic about greater economic cooperation with the United States, particularly in supporting its automotive industry and in investing in power generation facilities. Meanwhile, American companies have created roughly 300,000 jobs in Malaysia and provide scholarships, helping it transition from a manufacturing-heavy economy to a high-value-based one.

And yet, U.S. policy insists on framing Southeast Asia as a battleground and viewing its engagement in the region through the prism of U.S.–China competition. China—Asia’s largest country by landmass—will always play an important role in the destiny of its southern partners, due to deep historical, socio-cultural, and economic ties, as well as its size and proximity. Therefore, seeking to compete for influence with a zero-sum mentality is unhelpful. Indeed, all Southeast Asian states will seek cooperation with the United States as a means of balancing China, however, they also do so with other partners, including India and Japan. The ASEAN region fears coercion not just from Beijing but from Washington. According to one Southeast Asia analyst, regional leaders are concerned with “inconsistencies in the United States’ actual policies and practices when realpolitik considerations kick in” and being forced to “define the China threat in the same all-encompassing way” as Washington currently does.

But it appears that the United States is looking for more than just stable economic and security relations with Southeast Asian partners. The United States not only insists on promoting its presence in the region as a counterweight to Chinese influence—it also seeks political legitimacy as a leader, aiming to be respected as a regional power and have its model of human rights and governance accepted by regional partners.

The challenge is that Washington still approaches Southeast Asia in instrumental terms. The rhetoric about partnership and ASEAN-centrality has not always borne out in treating smaller partners with dignity. Rhetoric about winning over Southeast Asia relegates the region to a prize, rather than sovereign states with their own legitimate interests and autonomy. Even emerging powers like Indonesia have been, at times, treated with ambivalence despite praise of Indonesia’s leadership in the Indo-Pacific and purported influence. Time on the ground also matters. While Vice President Kamala Harris had a short visit to Jakarta last year, U.S. President Joe Biden only set foot in Southeast Asia’s largest state during the G20 summit in 2022. Similarly, the president only visited Cambodia during its chairmanship of ASEAN while Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin was dispatched to Phnom Penh after this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue ostensibly to repair deteriorating bilateral ties.

Some ASEAN member states also bristle at the double standards applied. Elites in Cambodia resent being lectured about democratic freedoms when a blind eye appears to be turned to internet media restrictions in neighboring Vietnam. Potentially trying to move past this sticking point, the Pentagon’s readout of Austin’s June visit to Phnom Penh omitted any mention of human rights. While it is natural to treat each bilateral partner differently, in the case of Southeast Asia, the unevenness is received cynically rather than raising the United States’ credentials as the defender of democracy. In dropping such an approach, it would be entirely possible for the United States to support free and fair elections without charges of hypocrisy.

Another issue is a long memory of U.S. military power and interference in Southeast Asia in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Indonesia, to name a few. Tinged with postcolonial resentment, perceptions of U.S. inaction over Israel’s mass killings of Palestinian civilians reverberate in Muslim-majority states, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei, generating a sense of solidarity with those who are deemed helpless in the face of military might. While current Southeast Asian elites are pragmatic in their relations with the United States, one wonders about the impact of this historical moment on America’s reputation among younger generations, both Muslim and non-Muslim, in the region in decades to come.

What does this mean for an incoming U.S. administration?

As mentioned, ASEAN leaders are pragmatic and will happily pursue opportunities with the United States and other partners as part of an omnidirectional foreign and strategic policy posture. A new U.S. president will find the region pulled in several directions, with new leaders at the helm. The Philippines will be more proactive in dealing with China’s aggression in the South China Sea, while Malaysia under Anwar Ibrahim and Cambodia under Hun Manet appear to be drawing closer to Beijing. Indonesia will likely see a more strident foreign policy under Prabowo, particularly against the West. Vietnam and Singapore have also seen a turnover of each country’s leadership, however, foreign policy settings are expected to remain steady, hedging between all major powers and partners.

This is typical ASEAN member state behavior and should not lead Washington to think that it has lost, even when certain partners forge closer ties to Beijing. There are areas where China has a comparative advantage, particularly in communications networks and infrastructure investment. The best approach for the United States is to continue investing in areas where it already enjoys strong cooperation or where it would satisfy the interests of Southeast Asian states.

Chief among these interests is economic growth. While it represents a concerted effort to improve US multilateral engagement in the region, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) provides only limited market access and tariff reductions for Southeast Asian partners which, in the eyes of one Southeast Asian analyst, “mak[es] meaningful economic engagement in the region unlikely.” By addressing some of the region’s concerns about freer trade and providing opportunities for non-IPEF members Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, the United States can take concrete steps toward supporting Southeast Asia’s sustainable economic growth and reducing dependency on China.

In the security realm, the United States is still the preferred partner for military exercises involving high-end warfare. Military activities that account for climate change-driven scenarios such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and humanitarian evacuation are also critically important to Southeast Asian nations.

Another priority area for some Southeast Asian partners is cyber security and regulatory environments. In addition to the recent CrowdStrike attack that brought down transport, banking, and healthcare systems worldwide, massive ransomware attacks in Indonesia during 2024 targeted 282 government ministries and agencies and exposed critical system vulnerabilities. Expanding cybersecurity cooperation has been included in the U.S.–Indonesia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership but this recent case highlights the urgency with which the United States and other partners must support Southeast Asia’s cyber resilience and strengthen public trust in online services.

There is potential to work with ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners (other countries with which ASEAN has partnerships), further multiplying the United States’ role in supporting sufficient nutrition for expanding populations, particularly children. Washington can work with Southeast Asian states and these international partners to develop long-term strategies for food security, leveraging its current research and development infrastructure into areas such as pest-resistant crops and more nutrient-rich grains. Food-producing countries like Australia have developed targeted strategies for engaging economically and boosting trade with Southeast Asian states, which could provide opportunities for complementing U.S. efforts.

One anxiety in Southeast Asian capitals is that deteriorating relations between the United States and China could cause states to choose sides. The more rhetoric about winning and losing is deployed, the more communities in Southeast Asia feel anxious that their country will be a target of either China or the United States if their government is seen to align more with one or the other.

After the election, a favorable outcome for Southeast Asia would be a U.S. president invested in relations with the region beyond merely competing with China. There will be elements of competitiveness, but it should certainly not be considered zero-sum. However the United States chooses to approach the region, ASEAN must also win.