How would the Trump or Harris administration approach Taiwan?

The Trump administration also sent high-level representatives to Taiwan. In August 2020, Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar visited Taiwan. Ostensibly organized to coordinate responses to the COVID-19 outbreak, this visit also built on past Cabinet-level visits to Taiwan during the George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and Obama administrations. The Trump administration also sent the highest-level State Department representative to Taiwan in decades with the visit to Taipei of Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and Environment Keith Krach in September 2020.

The Trump White House also updated America’s declaratory policy on Taiwan. It declassified the “Six Assurances,” a set of assurances made by former U.S. President Ronald Reagan in 1982 to clarify that the United States would not sacrifice Taiwan on the altar of better relations with Beijing. Under Trump, Washington also revised its verbal formula for describing its “one China” policy. Instead of identifying the tenets of America’s “one China” policy chronologically, as previously had been the norm, the Trump administration began enumerating the Taiwan Relations Act first, adding a reference to the six assurances, and then acknowledging the three U.S.-China joint communiques. This new formulation put America’s commitments to Taiwan’s defense first and its understandings with the PRC last. Although subtle, the new articulation of policy sent a signal of prioritization to leaders in Taipei and Beijing. While symbolically meaningful to Beijing and Taipei, there is no public evidence Trump knew or cared about these changes.

Whereas the Trump administration was forward-leaning in providing support for Taiwan’s security, sending high-level officials to Taiwan and updating America’s public articulation of its policy on Taiwan, it was the opposite on trade and economic issues. Trump prioritized securing a U.S.-China phase-1 trade agreement that would increase Chinese purchases of American exports and reduce the U.S.-China trade deficit. Under Trump, the United States Trade Representative’s (USTR) office viewed economic engagement with Taiwan as complicating their priority goal with Beijing. As a result, U.S. trade negotiations with Taiwan were put in the freezer for the duration of Trump’s tenure. No progress was made in developing any type of bilateral investment agreement or free trade agreement or in integrating Taiwan into any broader trade architecture. Under Trump, there was a clear disconnect between economic agencies, which largely avoided dealing with Taiwan, and security agencies, which emphasized efforts to strengthen support for Taiwan.

This disconnect spoke to a broader pattern within the Trump administration. Upon assuming office, key personnel in the Trump administration determined that the National Security Council had grown too overbearing and prone to micromanagement. In response, Trump’s National Security Council staff delegated greater autonomy to departments and agencies to pursue policies as they deemed fit. Instead of the traditional bottom-up policy deliberation process of issues being reviewed at staff levels and then being elevated to sub-cabinet and cabinet levels for recommendations for presidential decision, the policy process became more decentralized.

Since Trump’s skepticism of the benefits of supporting Taiwan was well known inside and outside government, there was a natural incentive for pro-Taiwan members of Trump’s staff to advance their own policy initiatives on Taiwan without attracting presidential attention. This contributed to a breakdown in institutionalization of interagency policy deliberations. Taiwan policy questions were not teed up for presidential decision. Instead, Cabinet-level officials took initiative to announce decisions, such as UN Ambassador Kelly Craft’s announcement of plans to visit Taiwan in the waning days of the administration (later cancelled), and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s announcement in the final 10 days of the Trump administration to remove restrictions on contact between U.S. and Taiwan diplomats.

Even though Trump himself was idiosyncratic on Taiwan, his administration pushed forward the U.S.-Taiwan relationship between 2017-2021. When Trump left office, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen expressed appreciation for the growth in U.S.-Taiwan relations and specifically the strong military support and public reassurance that the United States had provided Taiwan in the face of rising PRC pressure. Tsai and the Taiwan public also took comfort in Trump’s transparent hostility toward China following the outbreak of COVID-19, believing that Trump’s anger eliminated any risk that the United States might sell out Taiwan’s interests in service of specific goals with China. There was a palpable pro-Trump sentiment in Taiwan at the end of his term.

Biden’s approach to Taiwan

During the 2020 presidential campaign, then-candidate Joe Biden staked out a tough position on China, calling Xi a “thug,” condemning China’s actions in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, and vowing to stand firm in defense of Taiwan. Biden also criticized Trump for launching the 2018-2020 U.S.-China trade war, which he argued had created economic harm for American farms, factories, and workers without providing offsetting benefits. Biden slammed Trump’s trade war for destroying jobs and raising prices.

During the 2020 campaign and since, Biden consistently emphasized the important role allies and partners play as force multipliers of American influence on the world stage. Biden also prioritized efforts to shore up democratic institutions at home and abroad. This emphasis on partnerships and shared values provided strong points of connectivity between Washington and Taipei.

For the inauguration, the Biden team invited Taiwan’s representative in Washington, Bi-Khim Hsiao, to join as an official guest, marking the first time since 1979 that a Taiwan representative was officially invited by an incoming administration to attend an inauguration. Taiwan representatives previously had attended U.S. presidential inaugurations, but not as official guests of the inaugural committee.

Three months later, Biden sent his close friend, former Senator Chris Dodd, along with former Deputy Secretaries of State Richard Armitage and James Steinberg, as personal envoys to signal his focus on Taiwan. This practice of sending former officials as personal envoys of the president to Taiwan persisted throughout the Biden administration.

Also in the opening months of the Biden administration, the White House conducted extensive outreach to secure Taiwan’s support for helping resolve supply chain bottlenecks, particularly around semiconductor chips that were needed to reopen factory lines in the United States following COVID-19-induced shutdowns. Taiwan-based companies responded by surging production to help overcome shortages. This effort added purpose to the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, helping build a public narrative in the United States of Taiwan as a contributor to America’s well-being rather than a recipient of America’s security protection.

The Biden administration also worked early on to restore interagency coordination on Taiwan policy. They inherited a policy deliberation process that had grown unruly toward the end of the Trump administration, with various departments and agencies taking actions and making statements relating to Taiwan autonomously and without traditional coordination through the National Security Council. In the first year of the Biden administration, senior officials struggled to stay on message in public statements, most notably around questions of whether and when the PRC might use force against Taiwan. Senior Pentagon officials contradicted each other publicly multiple times in their forecasts of timelines of future conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Over time, the Biden administration deputized Director of Central Intelligence Bill Burns and Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines to address questions about potential PRC use of force. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin imposed a blanket public posture for all senior military officials that conflict in the Taiwan Strait is “neither imminent nor inevitable.”

These efforts were part of a broader White House push in the early months of the Biden administration to restore cohesion across departments and agencies in overall policy toward Taiwan. Over time, the Biden administration’s direction for the relationship came into focus, with an emphasis on “broadening and deepening” U.S.-Taiwan relations and supporting Taiwan in gaining security, confidence, prosperity, and respect.

Biden also has a long personal history with Taiwan. He is proud of reminding counterparts that he cast a vote for the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 as a senator. During his presidency, Biden showed personal interest in Taiwan policy, at times becoming more forward-leaning than his staff in signaling support for Taiwan. He became the first sitting president to vow to defend Taiwan, a pledge he made publicly four times, even as his staff sought each time to suggest that there had been no change to longstanding policy.

On security issues, the Biden administration expanded the scope of support that the United States provides to Taiwan. U.S. security experts have carried forward work with Taiwan counterparts to support the development of concepts and doctrines for an asymmetric defense strategy, which would enable Taiwan to exploit geographic advantages for its own defense. Additionally, the Biden administration for the first time determined Taiwan eligible for Presidential Drawdown Authority (which allows the president to provide military assistance from existing stockpiles, up to a cap to respond to foreign crises), resulting in the transfer of up to $345 million in defense items from Department of Defense stockpiles. The Biden administration also provided Foreign Military Financing to Taiwan and identified Taiwan as being eligible to receive Excess Defense Articles (American military equipment that is no longer needed) as grant assistance. These new policy innovations have expanded avenues for Taiwan to receive security support from the United States. The combination of Taiwan’s expanded defensive capabilities and more visible American commitment to Taiwan’s defense strengthened deterrence.

At the same time, America’s defense production lines have been strained by competing demands for defense articles. Taiwan has suffered from backlogs in delivery of items it previously purchased through Foreign Military Sales, hampering readiness. Critics of the Biden administration also accuse them of taking their eye off the ball in Taiwan as they focus on managing security crises in Europe and the Middle East.

Diplomatically, Washington has supported Taiwan in receiving more international support than at any previous time in recent decades. Part of this growing international support owes to Beijing’s visibly coercive behavior toward Taiwan. Much of this growing support for Taiwan is a result of rising global awareness of Taiwan’s critical role in regional and global affairs.

In support of efforts to internationalize support for Taiwan, there has been a proliferation of public statements by leaders in support of Taiwan’s security, including in the G7, European Union, NATO, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations. These statements also have translated into actions, including more visible military operations around Taiwan by countries such as Germany, France, Australia, Japan, and Canada. The Biden administration’s success in embedding Taiwan in a broader global framework is one of its signature achievements.

In addition, global support for—and involvement in—the Global Cooperation Training Framework (GCTF) has expanded under Biden. Japan, Australia, and Canada have signed on as full members. Begun in the Obama administration, the GCTF is a platform that allows practitioners from around the world to benefit from Taiwan’s expertise in addressing transnational challenges, such as pandemic preparedness, women’s empowerment, cyber security, and countering disinformation. This platform offsets Taiwan’s exclusion from many international institutions, allowing Taiwan to earn respect on the world stage through its contributions.

The Biden administration did not send a Cabinet level official to Taiwan. Taiwan leaders did have extensive contact with senior American legislators, though, including during then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taiwan and Tsai’s meeting with then-Speaker Kevin McCarthy at the Reagan Library in 2023. In between these high-profile engagements, Taipei hosted a steady stream of Congressional delegations.

In contrast to the Trump administration, the Biden administration leaned forward in expanding U.S.-Taiwan economic relations. In June 2023, both sides finalized the first agreement under the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade. This agreement is designed to spur deepening trade and economic engagement by streamlining regulations and cutting red tape for commerce and investment in both directions. Negotiations are ongoing for a second agreement that would address issues around agriculture, labor, and the environment. Both sides also are advancing efforts through the Technology Trade and Investment Collaboration framework (TTIC) to support two-way commerce between U.S. and Taiwan companies in the 5G, electric vehicle, energy, AI, semiconductor, and cybersecurity sectors.

The Biden administration also has advanced two other policy innovations to deepen U.S.-Taiwan ties. The first has been to urge sub-national engagement between American governors and mayors and their Taiwan counterparts. Eighteen U.S. states have either opened or are planning to establish offices in Taiwan to promote trade, travel, tourism, and investment. Such efforts add durability to the U.S.-Taiwan relationship by densifying links from the bottom-up. Second, the Biden administration has emphasized shared values as a rationale for deepening ties. Leaders on both sides have stressed their mutual commitment to democracy, rule of law, individual rights, and countering authoritarianism, including through their joint participation in Summits for Democracy.

Largely because of the cumulative weight of these collective efforts, Taiwan leaders now routinely declare the U.S.-Taiwan relationship is in the best shape it has ever been, meaning that U.S.-Taiwan relations today are stronger than they were during the Trump administration.

In review, the Trump administration leaned forward on security issues and in its symbolic support for Taiwan, even as it was largely absent in other areas of the relationship, such as trade. Trump’s disdain for alliances and security partnerships, though, negatively impacted Taiwan by calling into question the reliability of America’s security commitments. The Biden administration, by contrast, has pursued a more comprehensive, coherent, and coordinated approach for supporting Taiwan, including by mobilizing global support for Taiwan. Biden has systematically reinforced America’s commitments to its security partners. Where Trump was reluctant and cautious after his initial congratulatory call from Tsai, Biden has been bolder on Taiwan, even at times going beyond the rest of his administration in signaling support.

Harris and Taiwan

So far, Harris seems to value adherence to international law, rules, and norms. She has oriented her foreign policy statements around upholding key principles, including the principle that borders must not be redrawn by force. On Taiwan, Harris said during a visit to Yokosuka Naval Base in September 2022 that the United States opposes “any unilateral changes to the status quo” and that the United States would “support Taiwan’s self-defense, consistent with our longstanding policy.”

During an event at the Council on Foreign Relations in May 2024, Harris’s national security advisor, Phil Gordon, emphasized continuity on Taiwan. Gordon said, “We are interested in the political status quo in Taiwan. We don’t support Taiwan independence. We want peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. And we are constantly messaging China that it shouldn’t be interested in upsetting the political status quo in Taiwan either.”

Harris also has been consistently outspoken in defense of human rights around the world, including in China. She believes America derives benefit from its global network of allies and partners. Indeed, much of her engagement in Asia during her tenure as vice president has been with allies. She has met with leaders of all five of America’s Asian allies and visited four of them as vice president. Harris also met then vice president, now President Lai Ching-te in 2022 at Honduras’s presidential inauguration.

During an August visit to Beijing, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan was asked about Harris’s views on China. He responded in a press conference:

“Vice President Harris has been a central member of the Biden foreign policy team, a leading member, and has been part of the design and execution of the overall strategy in the Indo-Pacific and with respect to the responsible management of U.S.-China relations.

She has had the opportunity to engage herself with President Xi and with Premier Li. So she is known to both of the top leaders in China. And she shares President Biden’s view that responsibly managing this competition, so it doesn’t veer into conflict or confrontation, is essential. And she also shares the view that maintaining high-level, open lines of communication is the way that you can achieve that responsible management.”

Looking forward

Although Taiwan is not a topic that is dominating the 2024 U.S. presidential debate, it is an issue that America’s next president likely will spend considerable time managing over the next four years. Even setting aside facile predictions that China plans to conduct a military invasion of Taiwan in 2027, Beijing can reliably be expected to increase pressure on Taiwan during the next U.S. presidential term. China’s leaders appear determined to show directional progress toward their goal of asserting control over Taiwan. Taiwan’s elected leaders and the public show no interest in accommodating such an outcome.

Beijing is pursuing two parallel paths toward its goal of unification of Taiwan. The first is its significant military build-up. The second is its efforts short of use of force, what co-author Richard Bush has coined as “coercion without violence,” to compel the people of Taiwan to accept some form of union with the People’s Republic of China as a least bad option for Taiwan’s future. Beijing is massing capabilities to make progress on both paths, including by investing significantly in its military capabilities for a Taiwan contingency, as well as in cyber, law enforcement, coast guard, and united front capabilities to wear down the psychological will of Taiwan’s people over time.

Given the sharpening situation, Taiwan is unlikely to recede as an issue demanding American policy attention. The responses of America’s two presidential candidates to rising PRC pressure thus matter greatly to Taiwan’s future.

Trump has not spoken often in public about Taiwan, but when he has done so, it has mostly been to rehash grievances about how Taiwan has taken advantage of the United States. He has complained, for example, that Taiwan does not pay enough for American protection and that Taiwan has “ripped off” America’s semiconductor sector. The Republican Party’s 2024 platform omits any reference to Taiwan, in a departure from previous Republican platforms, which saluted the Taiwan people and pledged to uphold the Taiwan Relations Act.

If elected, Trump could take a transactional approach to Taiwan, treating it like an insurance company might treat a client who underpays on his/her premium. Trump might squeeze Taiwan to provide more benefits to the American people, perhaps by increasing purchases of American defense equipment, investing more in the United States, or insisting that Taiwan raise the amount it spends on its own defense.

Conversely, Trump will hear from some of his advisors that he should view Taiwan’s security as fundamental to America’s well-being. Trump’s pick for vice president, Senator J.D. Vance, has argued, for example, that the United States should de-prioritize support for Ukraine to shift more military focus to defending Taiwan.

While understandable on the surface, Vance’s logic is unlikely to define Trump’s approach to Taiwan. First, Trump has shown no inclination to voluntarily increase American security assistance for any partner without a visible reward for such actions. Doing so in the case of Taiwan would represent a break for Trump from decades of arguing that America would be foolish to “give away” security assistance to its partners. Second, not even Taiwan’s leaders wish for the United States to abandon Ukraine to support Taiwan. They judge that if Ukraine falls, it would represent a historically significant strategic setback for the United States, which would embolden Beijing and endanger Taipei. Third, and most critically, decisions relating to America’s response to any crisis in the Taiwan Strait are fundamentally presidential calls. Vice presidents provide counsel, but presidents ultimately decide whether and where to put American soldiers in harm’s way. In such a scenario, Trump’s longstanding aversion to taking on other partners’ problems would raise real questions about whether Trump would commit America to Taiwan’s defense.

At the end of the day, Trump’s approach to Taiwan—like his approach to most foreign policy issues—is difficult to predict. Trump is not encumbered by ideological thinking or bound to commitments to uphold international principles. He views his unpredictability as an asset in keeping adversaries off-balance. He is not a policy micro-manager. There is no evidence that Trump’s management of the policy process would be any different during a second administration than it was during the first. Much of his approach to Taiwan may depend upon who he selects for top policy positions.

Harris, by contrast, presents herself as a more systematic thinker. A lawyer by training, Harris does not often make pronouncements in black-and-white terms. She may be less likely to make public commitments to defend Taiwan than Biden has been. Despite this, she has shown several consistent throughlines to her foreign policy thinking during her time in elected office.

Harris has prioritized strengthening relations with allies and partners. She also has emphasized the need to uphold global principles such as the norm against seizing territory through force. Applied to Taiwan, this means that she likely would be disciplined in her public statements, guided by principles, and focused on a conception of America’s interest in upholding peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

Additionally, the Democratic Party’s 2024 platform emphasized the importance of allies and partners for preventing China from coercing its neighbors or overturning international rules. The platform also stressed the importance of upholding the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

All said, considering what we know of Harris’s views on Taiwan and cross-Strait relations, she is likely to maintain substantial continuity with the Biden administration’s policies. A categorical prediction is not possible at this time, in part because what a Harris administration does will be a function of the situation it faces, particularly how China’s actions towards Taiwan and the United States evolve and how else American leadership is tested on the world stage. It does appear, however, that Harris’s approach will have much more in common with Biden’s than it does with Trump’s.

Conclusion

The outcome of America’s November 5 presidential election will not hinge on Taiwan. The choice that America’s voters make for their next president, though, will have an outsized impact on America’s posture toward Taiwan and cross-Strait issues for years to come.